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Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota
Over Foreign Insurance Companies
The author of this Note discusses Minnesota law relating
to personal jurisdiction over foreign insurance companies
and finds that there is considerable doubt whether it ex-
tends as far as the federal constitution permits. He then
examines the necessity for extending the jurisdictional pow-
ers of Minnesota courts to these constitutional limits and
recommends appropriate legislation.
I
IF A foreign insurance company has qualified to do busi-
ness in the state, process may be served either upon an agent,' if
one can be found, or upon the Commissioner of Insurance, who has
been appointed agent for service of process as a prerequisite to
licensing.2 However, a problem arises in obtaining personal juris-
diction over foreign insurance companies which have not so qual-
ified and yet transact business with residents of the state. Typically,
their business, including the solicitation of contracts, is done only
through the mails; the company will have no office, agents or prop-
erty in the state. Although the constitutional requirements for ob-
taining personal jurisdiction over these companies have been greatly
liberalized by the United States Supreme Court, there is serious
doubt whether Minnesota law has expanded correspondingly.
II
Three United States Supreme Court decisions provide the guides
for determining when a state may exercise jurisdiction over foreign
insurance companies. In Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,3 the
Court upheld the power of the Virginia Corporation Commission
to order the defendant mail-order health insurance company to
cease and desist from further offerings or sales in Virginia. The de-
fendant had no agents, office, or property in Virginia; applications
were sent to recommended prospects by mail, and all other business
was done by mail.4 The Court, recognizing the interests of the
1. MINN. R. Civ. P. 4.03(c).2. MXNN. STAT. § 71.18 (1957).
3. 339 U.S. 643 (1950). See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Gm. L. Rrv. 569,
593-98 (1958).
4. However, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas places great emphasis
on the fact that the prospects were recommended by policyholders of the defend-
state in the insurance business and the importance to its citizens of
being able to enforce locally the obligations arising under the poli-
cies, upheld the action of the Virginia commission in a 5-4 decision.
The case did not present the problem of whether Virginia courts
had judicial jurisdiction to enforce rights of private parties under
the contracts. Actually, the opinion of the Court does not dearly
distinguish legislative and judicial jurisdiction, although it does
contain dictum indicating that policyholders could secure personal
jurisdiction to enforce their rights.5
Remaining doubts about the extent of judicial jurisdiction were
largely resolved by the Court in McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co.,8 decided late in 1957. The policy involved in that case was orig-
inally issued in Arizona and mailed to the insured. Later, a Texas
company, defendant in the case, agreed with the Arizona com-
pany to take over the business and accordingly offered a reinsur-
ance agreement by mail to the insured in California. He accepted.
The Court said:
It appears that neither Empire Mutual [the original insurer] nor re-
spondent has ever had any office or agent in California. And so far as the
record before us shows, respondent has never solicited or done any in-
surance business in California apart from the policy involved here.7
The Court found that due process was satisfied since the suit was
"based on a contract which had substantial connection with that
State."8 The substantial connections were: (1) the contract was
delivered in California (presumably by mail), (2) the premiums
were mailed from there, and (3) the insured was a resident of that
state when he died
Since jurisdiction in that case rested upon a single contract, it
might appear that territorial boundaries had become almost mean-
ingless as a restriction upon jurisdiction.10 However, the Court soon
demonstrated that the territorial concept of jurisdiction survives to
some extent. Hanson v. Denckla,n decided later in the same term
as McGee, held that Florida could not exercise personal jurisdiction
over a foreign trustee, where the only contacts with Florida were
that the testator lived in Florida, there executed an appointment
ant. 339 U.S. at 654. The majority also states that investigations on claims had
taken place in Virginia. Id. at 648.
5. Id. at 648-49.
6. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). For discussions of McGee, see Kurland, supra note 3 at
606-10; Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota Over Absent Defendants, 42
Mm. L. RPv. 909 (1958).
7. 355 U.S. at 222.
8. Id. at 223.
9. Ibi.
10. See Note, 42 Mum. L. REv. 909, 922 (1958).
11. 357 U.S. 235 (1958), 43 MwN. L. Rev. 569 (1959).
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under the trust, and from there corresponded with the trustee re-
garding administration of the trust, and that the court had secured
personal jurisdiction over some beneficiaries.
Although it is very difficult to support the distinction that the
Court finds between the two cases,"2 differences in approach are
discernible from the majority and minority opinions in Hanson.
The majority apparently requires certain contacts between the
forum and the nonresident defendant: "[Ilt is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State. . . ." ' The minority, however, uses the test of the sufficiency
of the relationship between the subject of the litigation and the
forum state.14 That this is also the apparent rationale of McGee
is probably due to the fact that the opinion of the Court in McGee
and the minority opinion in Hanson were both written by Mr. Jus-
tice Black.
If restricted to its facts, McGee is probably not limited by Han-
son although the precise limits of jurisdiction are still in doubt.
If the test depends upon contacts between the forum and defend-
ant, then there might be no jurisdiction in the case where the in-
sured, after taking out a policy elsewhere, moves into the forum
state and just continues to pay his premiums."' In such a case, it
could be argued that the company really has done nothing which
could be fairly characterized as "purposefully [availing] itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." In
fact, under many kinds of insurance contracts, it may have no
choice but to continue the contracts no matter where the policy-
holder moves.
But in spite of any doubts which may remain, it is clear that a
state now has extensive power to exercise in personam judicial
jurisdiction over absent foreign insurance companies.
III
States have chosen to expand their concepts of personal jurisdic-
tion to fit growth in the constitutional area in three ways: () pas-
sage of Unauthorized Insurers Service of Process Acts, (2) passage
of one-act statutes, and (3) informal, judicial lessening of the re-
quirements of "doing business."
Forty-three states have acts which they call Unauthorized In-
12. See Kurland, supra note 3, at 622 n.280.
13. 357 U.S. at 253.
14. See Kurland, supra note 3, at 621.
15. See Parmalee v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n of America, 206 F.2d
523 (5th Cir. 1953); 43 MINN. L. Hu~v. 569, 573-74 (1959).
[Vol. 43:992
1959] NOTES 995
surers Service of Process Acts. 6 These acts vary somewhat, but
most resemble the California Act involved in McGee:
§ 1610. Any of the acts described in Section 1611, vhen effected in
this State, by mail or otherwise, by a foreign or alien insurer which is
nonadmitted at the time of the solicitation, issuance or delivery by it of
contracts of insurance to residents of, or to corporations authorized to do
business in, this State, is equivalent to and shall constitute an appoint-
ment by such insurer of the commissioner and his successor or successors
in office to be its true and lawful attorney, upon whom may be served
all lawful process in any action, suit, or proceeding instituted by or on
behalf of an insured or beneficiary arising out of any such contracts of
insurance, and any such act shall be signification of its agreement that
such service of process is of the same legal force and validity as personal
service of process in this State upon such insurer.
§ 1611. The acts referred to in Section 1610 are:
(1) The issuance or delivery to residents of, or to corporations author-
ized to do business in, this State of contracts of insurance insuring (a)
the lives or persons of residents of this State physically present herein
at the time of such issuance or delivery or (b) property or operations
located in this State.
(2) The solicitation of applications for such contracts.
(3) The collection of premiums, membership fees, assessments or other
considerations for such contracts.
(4) Any other transaction of business arising out of such contracts.' 7
Minnesota has no such law as this. However, it does have a "one-
act" statute which provides:
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota
to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Minnesota, or if
such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Minne-
sota against a resident of Minnesota, such acts shall be deemed to be
doing business in Minnesota by the foreign corporation and shall be
deemed equivalent to the appointment by the foreign corporation of the
secretary of the State of Minnesota... to be its true and lawful attorney
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceed-
ings against the foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such
contract or tort... The making of the contract or the committing of the
tort shall be deemed to be the agreement of the foreign corporation that
any process against it which is so served. . . shall be of the same legal
force and effect as if served personally within the State of Minnesota.18
Although it appears from the portion quoted that this statute fills
the gap nicely, it does not, for it applies only to a foreign corpora-
tion, and the term "Foreign corporation' does not include . . .
insurance companies as defined by Minnesota Statutes, Section
60.02.... " 19
16. 1957 Proc. N.A.TC. 330.
17. CAL. INs. CODE ANN. §§ 1610-11 (West 1955).
18. MiNN. STAT. § 303.13(3) (1957).
19. Mnw. STAT. § 303.02(4) (1957).
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Although the statute above clearly excludes service of process on
insurance companies, the legislature may not have intended this
result. The amendment constituting the one-act statute was adopted
in 1957, long after the term "foreign corporation" was defined by
an earlier provision of the same section; consequently the distinc-
tion did not appear in the amendment itself. But even under the
theory of free interpretation the plain, unambiguous words of the
statute and the existence of a separate statute to provide for process
over insurance companies present formidable obstacles.2"
The insurance code, however, provides for service under cer-
tain circumstances:
Before any corporation, association, or company issuing policies of insur-
ance of any character and not organized or existing pursuant to the laws
of this state is admitted to or authorized to transact the business of insur-
ance in this state, it shall, by a duly executed instrument to be fied
in the office of the commissioner, constitute and appoint the commissioner
and his successors in office its true and lawful attorney, upon whom
proofs of loss, any notice authorized or required by any contract with
the company to be served on it, summonses and all lawful processes in
any action or legal proceeding against it may be served, and that the
authority thereof shall continue in force irrevocable so long as any lia-
bility of the company remains outstanding in this state.2 '
Although this section on its face provides no assistance when a
company has not complied, it has been held that a defendant is
estopped from denying compliance and consents to appointment
of the commissioner as agent by doing business in the state.
In Kulberg v. Fraternal Union22 the defendant, through a con-
solidation of two companies, took over the contracts of a company
which had been authorized to do business in Minnesota. However,
the defendant had never complied with a section similar to that
quoted above, providing for appointment of the insurance commis-
sioner as agent for service of process.2 3 The court did not rely on
the fact that the corporation was a continuance of the earlier one,
but rather based its decision on an estoppel theory.24 In Massey
S.S. Co. v. Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.25 the court again used this ap-
proach. The defendants were foreign insurance companies which
had not appointed the insurance commissioner as their agent for
service of process and had no office or official representative in
Minnesota. In spite of the noncompliance, the summons was served
on the insurance commissioner. The court held that
20. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAnv. L. REv. 863, 878-85 (1930).
21. MrIx. STAT. § 71.18 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
22. 131 Minn. 131, 154 N.W. 748 (1915).
23. See Minn. Gen. Stat. § 3555 (1913).
24. 131 Minn. at 134, 154 N.W. at 750.
25. 153 Minn. 136, 189 N.W. 714 (1922).
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appellants failed to establish immunity from the service made in these
cases by merely showing that the contract of insurance was not executed
in this state and that they had no officer, agent or place of business in
Minnesota and had not appointed the insurance commissioner as their
attorney in fact to receive service of process.2 6
The court further held that since the plaintiffs were citizens of
the state, since the insured property was in the state, and since the
defendants had issued other policies in the state, the process was
sufficiene 7
However, this fiction of consent by doing business in the state
was later limited. In Sivertsen v. Bancamerica-Blair Corp., Judge
Nordbye was asked to apply the securities registration statute in
the same way as the insurance statute was applied in the earlier
cases. The plaintiff argued that the defendant was estopped to
deny appointment of the Commissioner of Securities as agent be-
cause of noncompliance with the statute. The federal district court
extensively analyzed the applicable Minnesota law and found that
while the fiction was clearly established, it was limited to cases
where the company was still doing business in the state at the
time of service.29 Therefore, jurisdiction over a company which
had ceased doing business in the state could be secured only where
a statute specifically provides that if a corporation does not register,
it shall be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction. The stat-
ute construed in that case was not such a statute, nor is the in-
surance statute quoted above. This interpretation of Minnesota
law was approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Babcock
v. Bancameric a-Blair Corp 0
This result is undesirable. As long as the court is willing to con-
strue the statute to provide jurisdiction over some companies which
have not complied, there is no analytical reason why the result
should be different just because a company has stopped doing
business in the state. In fact, the policy considerations are then
even stronger for allovhing jurisdiction, since other sanctions31 which
may prove effective to some degree against the company that is
still doing business locally would not be available against the com-
pany that has discontinued business. Also, if jurisdiction is con-
tested, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to show that a defendant
is still doing business within the forum state, for only the insurer
will have this information.
26. Id. at 142, 189 N.W. at 717.
27. ibid.
28. 48 F. Supp. 238 (D. Minn. 1940).
29. Id. at 238.
80. 212 Minn. 428, 4 N.W.2d 89 (1942) (securities).
31. See text accompanying notes 34-87 infra.
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Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court has subsequently
indicated that the fictional concept of presence in the forum has
been abandoned as the real basis for asserting jurisdiction. 2 Of
course, so has the concept of consent. In view of the abandonment
of such fictions, the Minnesota Supreme Court need not con-
tinue to make the distinction, although the clear holdings make
prediction of such a change somewhat uncertain. Consequently,
until the legislature passes a law explicitly providing for appoint-
ment of the commissioner as agent even without consent, a plain-
tiff may not be able to secure jurisdiction over a foreign insurer un-
less it can be shown that it is still doing business in the state.
However, even if the distinction above is resolved so that it is
irrelevant whether or not the foreign insurer is still doing business
within the state, the problem remains of defining just how much ac-
tivity constitutes "the business of insurance." It could be argued that
the Minnesota Supreme Court would judicially extend the meaning
of these terms to correspond with the constitutional limits. In one
case, the court has implied that it would do so:
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are controlling
upon the question of whether a foreign corporation was doing business
in a state, of such a character as to expose it to suit in the courts of the
state.33
Several considerations compel the conclusion that the court ought
to close any gap between the constitutional limits and the Minne-
sota position. First, the fact that the gap exists at all will cause un-
necessary litigation of the jurisdictional issue in the area of doubt.
Second, if jurisdiction is contested it may be difficult or even im-
possible for the plaintiff to get the facts showing that the defendant
has done any business in the state other than that involved in the
suit.
Third, the time at which the insured finds out that he will have
trouble collecting on the insurance is usually a time of disaster, or
at least severe financial strain, when he is least able to sustain the
harm caused by lack of enforceable coverage. He may have relied
on the insurance for support of his family or to meet medical ex-
penses. Anything which will add to the cost of recovery will magnify
his difficulty. The real reason for permitting personal jurisdiction
over foreign corporations is that they are better able than individual
plantiffs to withstand the financial burden of litigating in a foreign
jurisdiction. There is no reason to except insurance companies
from this burden if it is placed on other corporations.
32. Schilling v. Roux Distrib. Co., 240 Minn. 71, 80-81, 59 N.W.2d 907, 912
(1953).
33. Massey S.S. Co. v. Norske Lloyd Ins. Co., 153 Minn. 136, 139, 189 N.W.
714, 716 (1922).
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Fourth, it is well known that the public is reluctant enough to
sue on small claims; when any discouragement is added, this re-
luctance becomes even greater. Unless jurisdiction can be obtained
locally, recovery on these small claims will become almost impossi-
ble because of the inconvenience and additional cost.
Fifth, since Minnesota has neither an applicable one-act statute
nor an Unauthorized Insurers Act, it may be unusually attractive
to the mail order insurance companies.
Of course, the insurance commissioner can take certain steps
against a company which engages in these practices without be-
coming licensed to do business in the state. He can issue a cease
and desist order 4 and widely publicize it. 5 He can ask the insur-
ance commissioner in the state where the company is domiciled to
exert pressure. He may even be able to get extradition of those re-
sponsible for violating Minnesota law.30 However, none of these
activities by the commissioner will secure a return of premiums or
a payment on a claim for the individual who has been caught by
the mail order net. And, although the insurance commissions have
a reputation for effective regulation, the company concerned may
be in a state where the commissioner is either unable or unwilling
to stop the undesirable practices. Furthermore the commissioner
probably will not learn of the activities until the harm has al-
ready occurred. Consequently these possibilities are not suffi-
cient protection for the individual.
Although the above considerations weigh heavily for the con-
clusion that the court ought to close the gap, several factors will
support the opposite conclusion. It is clear that jurisdictional limits
were substantially extended by the legislature when it passed the
one-act statute applying to most foreign corporations. Obviously
the legislature must have felt that Minnesota law had not been ex-
tended as far as it constitutionally could be, for there would be
little point in passing the statute if a single contract would support
34. MINN. STAT. § 60.12 (1957).
35. The news media are usually quite cooperative in such matters.
36. MINN. STAT. § 72.10 (1957) provides that every company, and every of-
ficer or agent of any company, acting in violation of the Minnesota insurance laws
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor on the first offense, and of a gross misdemeanor
for each subsequent offense. The question whether there can be extradition for a
misdemeanor was apparently settled in Ex Parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642 (1885),
involving a charge of obtaining goods by false pretenses, which was punishable as a
misdemeanor in the state of commission. The Court stated that it was erroneous
to assume that there could be no extradition for a crime less than a felony, and
that it is available for every offense, "from the highest to the lowest." Id. at 650.
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 9 U.L.A. 263 (1957), has been adopted
in forty-two states, 9 U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1958), including Minnesota. Mn.. STAT.
§§ 629.01-.29 (1957). It provides that any person guilty of a crime within a state,
and not present in that state, may be extradited.
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jurisdiction without the additional legislation. The one-act statute
with its exceptions stands in clear contrast to the insurance statute
which the legislature has not extended. And it is difficult to say
that the legislature thought the "doing business" concept expanded
on its own for insurance companies but not for other corporations.
Finally, it has been observed that there is a substantial time lag
before states judicially expand their constitutional concepts of
doing business to correspond with the permissible constitutional
limits.37
IV
In addition to desirable judicial construction of the statute, there
are several possible solutions. The legislature could amend section
71.18 by providing that when a company does not register, it will
be deemed to have done so by transacting business within the
state. Or it could amend the one-act statute to include insurance
companies.
However, the most satisfactory solution would be to enact the
same kind of statute as California had in the McGee case,", since
the one-act statutes are still surrounded with at least some uncer-
tainty.3 9 Furthermore, it may be necessary for a state to use a
statute as a means of declaring the public interest which is help-
ful to sustain such legislation.40 Enactment of the statute would
resolve much of the doubt which now exists. The result would be
a more practical means for Minnesota citizens to protect their
rights in an area of great personal importance to them, and one in
which the state has traditionally desired its citizens to have the
greatest protection consistent with practicality.
37. Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IOWA L. REv.
345, 359 (1959).
38. CAL. INs. CODE ANN. §§ 1610-20 (West 1955).
39. See Note, 42 MrmN. L. REv. 909, 920-22 (1958).
40. Cf. 43 Mmn. L. R1v. 569, 576 (1959). But see Kurland, supra note 3,
at 622 n.280.
1000 [Vol. 43:992
